PAGES 1 - 25 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA BEFORE THE HONORABLE WILLIAM H. ORRICK WARREN GARDNER, LORI MYERS, ANGELA COSGROVE, AUTUMN HESSONG, ROBERT MCQUADE, COLLEEN MCQUADE, HAMES BORRUSO, FIDEL JAMELO, JOCELYN JAMELO, ANTHONY LUCIANO, LORI LUCIANO, ROBERT NUGENT, AVRAHAM ISAC ZELIG, KEN PETROVCIK, MEGAN KIIHNE, AND KATHLEEN MILLER, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS, CASE NO. 19-CV-02561 WHO VS. STARKIST CO., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, AND DONGWON INDUSTRIES CO. LTD, A SOUTH KOREA CORPORATION, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA DEFENDANT.) WEDNESDAY

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE OFFICIAL ELECTRONIC SOUND RECORDING 2:42 P.M. - 3:14 P.M.

) NOVEMBER 6, 2019

(APPEARANCES ON FOLLOWING PAGE)

TRANSCRIBED BY: JOAN MARIE COLUMBINI, CSR #5435, RPR
RETIRED OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER, USDC

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BY: CHRISTOPHER KAO, ESQUIRE

REBECCA FRIEDEMANN, ESQUIRE

1	WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 2019 2:42 P.M.									
2	(TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: DUE AT TIMES TO COUNSELS' FAILURE TO									
3	IDENTIFY THEMSELVES WHEN SPEAKING, CERTAIN SPEAKER									
4	ATTRIBUTIONS ARE BASED ON EDUCATED GUESS.)									
5	000									
6	ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED PROCEEDINGS									
7	THE CLERK: CALLING MATTER 19-2561, GARDNER, ET AL.									
8	VERSUS STARKIST COMPANY.									
9	COUNSEL, PLEASE COME FORWARD AND STATE YOUR									
10	APPEARANCE.									
11	MR. PENNY: GOOD AFTERNOON, YOUR HONOR. BRIAN PENNY									
12	FROM GOLDMAN, SCARLATO & PENNY ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFS.									
13	THE COURT: GOOD AFTERNOON.									
14	MR. DAVIDSON: GOOD AFTERNOON, YOUR HONOR. STUART									
15	DAVIDSON FROM ROBBINS, GELLER, RUDMAN & DOWD ON BEHALF OF THE									
16	PLAINTIFFS.									
17	MS. RYAN: GOOD AFTERNOON. ELAINE RYAN FROM BONNETT									
18	FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN & BALINT ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS.									
19	THE COURT: WELCOME.									
20	MR. KAO: GOOD AFTERNOON, YOUR HONOR. CHRIS KAO WITH									
21	PILLSBURY, ALONG WITH REBECCA FRIEDEMANN, ON BEHALF OF									
22	DEFENDANT DONGWON.									
23	THE COURT: GOOD AFTERNOON.									
24	MR. LYNCH: GOOD AFTERNOON, YOUR HONOR. MICHAEL									
25	LYNCH FROM THE LAW FIRM OF KELLEY DRYE ON BEHALF OF STARKIST.									

MR. BOYLE: GOOD AFTERNOON. JOE BOYLE FROM KELLY 1 2 DRYE, ALSO ON BEHALF OF STARKIST. 3 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. GOOD AFTERNOON, EVERYBODY. 4 ALL RIGHT. LET ME TELL YOU WHAT I'M THINKING. 5 IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 6 UNLIKE THE WAY THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAVE CHARACTERIZED IT, IS 7 NOT ALLEGING A VIOLATION OF THE DOLPHIN PROTECTION CONSUMER INFORMATION ACT BY NOT USING THE OFFICIAL DOLPHIN-SAFE MARK. 8 9 THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ALLEGING THAT STARKIST REPRESENTS THAT NO 10 DOLPHINS ARE KILLED OR SERIOUSLY INJURED. THAT'S WHAT THEIR 11 CLAIM IS AND THAT ITS SUSTAINABLE -- OR ITS UNSUSTAINABLE 12 FISHING PRACTICES ARE KILLING OR HARMING A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF DOLPHINS EACH YEAR. 1.3 14 SO, GIVEN THAT UNDERSTANDING OF THE FIRST AMENDED 15 COMPLAINT, FIRST, I WOULD GRANT STARKIST'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL 16 NOTICE, BUT THAT DOESN'T RESULT IN DISMISSAL BECAUSE OF THE 17 PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS ARE NOT COVERED BY THE DPCIA. I THINK FRAUD IS SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED. I THINK 18 19 STANDING IS ADEQUATELY ALLEGED. I DON'T THINK RICO IS. 20 ENTERPRISE IS ALLEGED TO -- CONCLUSORY AND COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY 21 DOES NOT EQUATE TO A CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE. BUT THE STATE LAW 22 CLAIMS AREN'T PREEMPTED, I THINK, BECAUSE THE CLAIM ISN'T A 23 VIOLATION -- IS NOT FOR A VIOLATION OF THE DPCIA. 24 WITH RESPECT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION, I DON'T --25 IT'S NOT OBVIOUS TO ME THAT THERE IS ANY OVER DONGWON.

STARKIST WAS INITIALLY ADEQUATELY CAPITALIZED. THAT'S WHERE 1 I'M -- WHERE YOU START, I THINK. A PARENT'S NOT AUTOMATICALLY 2 3 LIABLE FOR THE ACTIONS OF THE SUBSIDIARY TO ALLEGE THAT THAT IS 4 CHAEBOL, YOU HAVE TO DO MORE THAN DO A CONCLUSORY PLEADING. 5 DON'T THINK THAT'S A SHOWING OF ALTEREGO. AT THE MOMENT THERE 6 ARE NO FACTS THAT WOULD SHOW AN INEOUITABLE RESULT. 7 THINK THERE ARE INSUFFICIENT FACTS ALLEGED REGARDING AGENCY. AND I'M NOT INCLINED AT THE MOMENT TO ALLOW 8 9 JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY. I THINK IN THE DISCOVERY OF THIS 10 CASE THERE MAY BE -- A FACTUAL BASIS FOR BRINGING DONGWON IN 11 MIGHT BE DEVELOPED. I DON'T KNOW. BUT I JUST -- AT THE MOMENT 12 I JUST DON'T SEE WHY THEY ARE AN APPROPRIATE PARTY IN THE CASE. SO LET ME START WITH STARKIST AND THE MOTION TO 1.3 14 DISMISS. 15 MR. LYNCH: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. MICHAEL LYNCH, L-Y-N-C-H, FOR STARKIST. 16 17 YOUR HONOR, I'VE HEARD THE POSITIONS. I'M STILL GOING TO ADDRESS THEM. I THINK THERE ARE SOME THAT WE WOULD 18 19 LIKE TO MAKE A FEW POINTS ON. 20 THE COURT: GO AHEAD. 21 MR. LYNCH: FOR SURE. 22 SO I'M GOING TO -- YOUR HONOR, THE DPCIA WAS PASSED 23 30 YEARS AGO, AND IT SETS FORTH A VERY COMPREHENSIVE STRUCTURE 24 FOR THE ENTIRE TUNA INDUSTRY, FROM FISHING, TO THE EQUIPMENT 25 YOU CAN USE, TO THE LOCATIONS YOU CAN FISH AND THE TYPE AND

TECHNIQUES OF FISHING YOU CAN USE IN DIFFERENT LOCATIONS AROUND

THE GLOBE, AND IT SETS FORTH TRANSPORTATION, VERIFICATION,

CERTIFICATION --

THE COURT: SO I UNDERSTAND.

MR. LYNCH: RIGHT.

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THE COURT: I DO UNDERSTAND ALL THAT. SO THE QUESTION IS WHETHER YOU MADE A WARRANTY OR A PROMISE OF SOMETHING MORE. THAT'S -- THAT'S WHAT THE ISSUE IS. I DON'T KNOW WHY YOU DON'T USE THE LOGO THAT THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SUGGESTS. IT'S A BEAUTIFUL LOGO, BUT YOU HAVE YOUR OWN WHICH IS GREAT. BUT I DO THINK THAT THE EXPRESSION IS A LITTLE DIFFERENT SO THAT'S WHAT -- THAT'S WHERE I THINK YOU OUGHT TO BE FOCUSED.

MR. LYNCH: RIGHT. I'M BUILDING UP TO THAT.

SO THE POINT THAT THEY'VE ALLEGED WE PROMISED MORE IS NOT SET FORTH IN THE COMPLAINT, AND IT'S NOT REALLY FLESHED OUT IN A FACTUAL WAY AT ALL. WHAT IT -- WHAT IT -- YOU KNOW, THE FIRST TIME THAT THEY MAKE THE ARGUMENT THAT IT IS SOMETHING BEYOND THE FEDERAL REGULATION THAT IS A PROMISE THAT STARKIST MADE IS ONLY REALLY IN THE OPPOSITION BRIEF.

BUT THE PLEADING ITSELF DOES TWO THINGS THAT I THINK

ARE REALLY IMPORTANT TO FOCUS ON. THE FIRST IS, YOU KNOW GOING

TO THE POINT YOU'RE ASKING ABOUT, THE LABEL ITSELF.

SO ON PARAGRAPH 23 OF THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, WHICH IS DOCUMENT ECF 37. IT'S PAGE 9 OF 91 OF THE FILING OR

PAGE 7 OF THE COMPLAINT.

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THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.

MR. LYNCH: SO THIS IS THE ONLY THING THESE

PLAINTIFFS HAVE ALLEGED THAT THEY SAW THAT WAS UTTERED BY

STARKIST, AND AS YOU SEE IT ONLY SAYS "DOLPHIN SAFE." THERE IS

NO REQUIREMENT IN THE DPCIA, THE DCPIA, THAT EVERYONE HAS TO

USE THAT LOGO THAT THEY HAVE SET FORTH. THAT LOGO ALSO ONLY

SAYS "DOLPHIN SAFE." THAT'S THE ONLY CLAIM. SO HOW YOU GET

FROM -- YOU KNOW, WHILE IT IS A DIFFERENT LABEL -- I'M NOT

GOING TO ARGUE WITH YOU ON THAT -- IT'S THE LABEL THAT WE'VE

HAD FOR A LONG, LONG TIME. IT IS NOT MAKING ANY CLAIMS OTHER

THAN DOLPHIN SAFE, AND THAT IS A -- THAT IS A DEFINED TERM IN

THE DPCIA, AND IT'S A TERM THAT HAS BEEN, YOU KNOW, RELIED UPON

IN THIS INDUSTRY FOR 30 YEARS. IT IS A TERM THAT HAS VERY

SPECIFIED DEFINED, YOU KNOW, MEANING, AND WE MEET THOSE

OBLIGATIONS, AND THE PLAINTIFFS REALLY HAVEN'T ALLEGED THAT WE

DON'T.

YOU KNOW, THE OTHER THING IN PARAGRAPH 71 OF THE COMPLAINT, JUDGE -- AND, YOU KNOW, THIS DOESN'T GO DIRECTLY TO THE LABEL QUESTION, BUT THIS IS ALSO AN ALLEGATION THAT A REASONABLE CONSUMER WOULD UNDERSTAND THE DOLPHIN SAFE TERM TO BE THE REGULATORY DEFINITION, RIGHT. AND SO THE REGULATORY DEFINITION IS WHAT IT IS IN THE DPCIA. WE ARE COMPLIANT WITH IT.

THE COMPLAINT DOESN'T IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC INSTANCE

WHERE WE'RE EVER NOT -- WHERE STARKIST FAILED TO COMPLY. THEY
DON'T IDENTIFY A SINGLE INSTANCE WHERE A DOLPHIN WAS HURT OR
INJURED DURING A CATCH OR AN EXPEDITION THAT RESULTED IN TUNA
THAT STARKIST PURCHASED AND SOLD.

THE COURT: WELL, I THINK THAT'S ADEQUATELY ALLEGED.

THE -- NOT THAT THERE'S A SPECIFIC DOLPHIN THAT WAS INJURED,

BUT BY THE FISHING PRACTICES THAT WERE USED. I THINK THAT'S

ENOUGH FOR THE COMPLAINT. BUT I AM MORE INTERESTED IN THIS

FIRST ARGUMENT THAT YOU'RE MAKING.

MR. LYNCH: THE QUESTION OF THE DOLPHIN SAFE?

THE COURT: YEAH.

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MR. LYNCH: SO THERE'S NO PLACE IN THE COMPLAINT THAT ALLEGES THAT WE MADE SOME PROMISE MORE THAN THAT. THE COMPLAINT ITSELF SAYS THAT THE REASONABLE CONSUMER WOULD ASSUME THAT DOLPHIN SAFE MEANS WHAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS SAID IT MEANS. WE HAVE COMPLIED WITH THAT. OUR PRACTICES HAVE BEEN IN COMPLIANCE. AND, YOU KNOW, WE'VE BEEN SUBJECT TO INSPECTION AND POLICING BY NOAA, WHICH HASN'T FOUND ANY PROBLEMS, AND WE CERTAINLY DON'T SEE ANY SET FORTH IN THE COMPLAINT.

I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT TO PUT IN PERSPECTIVE, TOO,

THE PURPOSE OF DCPIA AND THE HISTORY OF IT -- AND IT MAY SHED

SOME LIGHT ON THE QUESTION YOU JUST RAISED, SO -- SO IT WAS

CREATED, RIGHT, TO ADDRESS -- BY CONGRESS TO ADDRESS A PROBLEM.

THERE HAD BEEN AN OUTCRY OVER PHOTOS THAT HAD GONE AROUND OF

DOLPHINS, RIGHT? AND I KNOW YOU REALIZE SOME OF THIS. AND

1	THEY CREATED THIS COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME.										
2	CONGRESS THEN APPOINTED NOAA, THE NATIONAL OCEANIC										
3	ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION TO POLICE IT, RIGHT? AND THOSE JOBS										
4	WERE IT WAS DEFINED, AND NOAA WAS GIVEN THE JOB OF POLICING										
5	IT.										
6	NOW, OVER 30 YEARS THE INDUSTRY HAS RELIED UPON THAT,										
7	AND THE INDUSTRY HAS WORKED TO DEVELOP THAT, AND DOLPHIN										
8	MORTALITY HAS GONE DOWN 99 PERCENT. SO BACK IN THE LATE 1980'S										
9	YOU WERE TALKING ABOUT HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF DOLPHINS										
10	GETTING HURT OR INJURED IN A YEAR ASSOCIATED WITH TUNA FISHING.										
11	THAT NUMBER IS NOW DOWN BELOW A THOUSAND, NOT ONE OF WHICH DO										
12	PLAINTIFFS PUT ON STARKIST, NOR COULD THEY. THERE'S NOT AN										
13	ALLEGATION THAT ANY STARKIST TUNA WAS PART OF THAT CATCH, AND										
14	THERE'S NO FACTS TO SUPPORT THAT.										
15	NOW, YOU KNOW, WHAT PLAINTIFFS ARE REALLY SAYING, THE										
16	ARGUMENT IS, THAT FEDERALLY MANDATED PROGRAM WAS NOT GOOD										
17	ENOUGH, AND, YOU KNOW, JUDGE, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED										
18	STATES VERSUS LOCKE.										
19	THE COURT: MR. LYNCH, YOU'RE RUNNING BACK INTO THE										
20	PREPARED ARGUMENT THAT YOU MADE, WHICH										
21	MR. LYNCH: YES.										
22	THE COURT: IS OKAY.										
23	MR. LYNCH: BUT THERE'S A REASON WHY, JUDGE. THE										
24	REASON										
25	THE COURT: NO, THERE'S NOT A GOOD REASON TO DO IT										

WHEN YOU'RE NOT ADDRESSING THE ISSUE THAT I HAVE WITH THIS. 1 I KNOW ALL -- I KNOW WHAT YOUR ARGUMENT IS. 2 I READ THE BRIEFS. 3 AND I'M TRYING TO GET YOU TO FOCUS ON SOMETHING THAT MIGHT 4 CHANGE MY MIND, NOT TO MAKE THE POINT THAT YOU ALREADY MADE TO 5 ME BEFORE. 6 MR. LYNCH: ALL RIGHT. SO THEN, YOUR HONOR, TO ME 7 THE DOLPHIN SAFE PROMISE IS WHAT IT IS. SO WHAT THE PLAINTIFFS 8 NEED TO DO THEN IS TELL STARKIST IN A COMPLAINT, IN A PLEADING, WHAT PARTICULARLY ABOUT THAT LABEL IS MISLEADING AND HOW IS IT 9 DIFFERENT FROM THE PROMISE THAT THE FEDERALLY-MANDATED LABEL 10 11 BRINGS. IF THEY -- BOTH LABELS HAVE TWO WORDS "DOLPHIN SAFE." 12 WHAT IS IT ABOUT THAT THAT IS DIFFERENT THAT WE NEED TO ADDRESS? HOW IS STARKIST GOING TO POLICE ITSELF IF IT DOESN'T 1.3 14 KNOW -- OR DEFEND ITSELF HERE IF IT DOESN'T KNOW WHAT PROMISE 15 IT'S ALLEGED TO HAVE MADE THAT IS GREATER THAN THE FEDERAL 16 STANDARD. 17 THE COURT: OKAY. YOU KNOW, I THINK THAT ULTIMATELY IS THE 18 MR. LYNCH: 19 WE DON'T HAVE THOSE ALLEGATIONS. WHAT WE HAVE IS, OUESTION. 20 YOU KNOW, THE CONCLUSORY STATEMENTS. 21 THE COURT: YOU'VE POINTED ME TO TWO PARAGRAPHS, AND I'M EAGER TO ASK THE PLAINTIFFS ABOUT THAT. 22 23 MR. LYNCH: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. 24 THE COURT: THANK YOU. 25 MR. PENNY: YOUR HONOR, BRIAN PENNY ON BEHALF OF THE

PLAINTIFFS.

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I IMAGINE YOU'RE GOING TO WANT TO KNOW WHERE THE

COMPLAINT THAT WE ALLEGE THAT STARKIST DOLPHIN SAFE LABEL IS

SOMETHING DIFFERENT THAN WHAT THE DPCIA REQUIRES.

THE COURT: I HAVE BEEN LOOKING AT PARAGRAPH 23 AND 71. SO TELL ME WHERE ELSE I SHOULD BE LOOKING.

MR. PENNY: YEAH, THERE ARE MANY OTHER PARAGRAPHS IN THE COMPLAINT THAT TALK ABOUT THIS.

AND JUST TO FRAME THAT ISSUE FOR YOU, REMEMBER, AS

DEFENSE COUNSEL JUST TOLD YOU, THE REASON THAT CONGRESS WAS

ANIMATED TO CREATE THE DPCIA WAS CONSUMER OUTRAGE ABOUT DOLPHIN

SLAUGHTERS. THE REASON STARKIST BEAT THEM TO THE PUNCH AND

BEFORE THE DCPIA WAS EVER ENACTED CREATED THEIR OWN DOLPHIN

SAFE LABEL AND DOLPHIN SAFE PROMISE TO CONSUMERS WAS TO

CAPITALIZE ON A PR OPPORTUNITY, THAT THEY KNEW CONSUMERS WERE

VERY INTERESTED IN DOLPHIN SAFE TUNA NOW, AND STARKIST WAS

GOING TO DELIVER THAT TO THEM.

THAT'S WHY IN PARAGRAPH 16, FOR EXAMPLE, WE NOTE THAT WHEN STARKIST WENT ON ITS MEDIA BLITZKRIEG IN APRIL OF 1990 TO ANNOUNCE ITS DOLPHIN-SAFE PROGRAM, IT TOLD CONSUMERS AT THAT POINT IN TIME THAT IT WAS COMMITTED TO DOLPHIN SAFETY, THERE WOULD BE A SPECIAL LOGO ON EVERY CAN OF STARKIST TUNA TO REFLECT THAT, AND THE LOGO WOULD MEAN NO HARM TO DOLPHINS; NOTHING SHORT OF DOLPHIN SAFE TUNA WILL BE ACCEPTABLE. THAT'S STARKIST'S OWN WORDS.

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THAT IS A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT PROMISE THAN WHAT THE DCPIA REQUIRES BECAUSE YOU KNOW NOW THAT HAVING READ ALL THE BRIEFS THAT THE DCPIA TOLERATES A CERTAIN LEVEL OF DOLPHIN MORTALITY IF CERTAIN OTHER REQUIREMENTS ARE MET.

THAT IS NOT STARKIST'S PROMISE. STARKIST'S PROMISE

GOES ABOVE THAT. IT'S REITERATED THAT VERY SAME PROMISE AND

COMMITMENT TO CONSUMERS THROUGHOUT THE LAST 30 YEARS. FOR

EXAMPLE, IN THE COMPLAINT AT PARAGRAPH 38, WE REFERENCE OR WE

CITE FROM THE PRESS RELEASE THAT STARKIST ISSUED, ALONG WITH

ITS COMPETITORS, CHICKEN OF THE SEA AND BUMBLE BEE, REMINDING

CONSUMERS IN THE MIDST OF THIS WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION DISPUTE

ABOUT WHAT "DOLPHIN SAFE" MEANS IN THE UNITED STATES. THEY

DOUBLED DOWN ON THAT PROMISE, AND THEY SAID THAT STARKIST DOES

NOT AND WILL NOT UTILIZE TUNA CAUGHT IN A MANNER THAT HARMS

DOLPHINS. AGAIN, THAT'S ABOVE AND BEYOND THE DPCIA'S

REQUIREMENTS. AND IT ALSO ADDED PROVIDING CONSUMERS WITH

SUSTAINABLE AND DOLPHIN SAFE TUNA REMAINS A TOP PRIORITY.

SOMETHING THAT WASN'T REFERENCED A LOT BUT IS IN THE COMPLAINT IN PARAGRAPH 179, THERE'S A TABLE IN WHICH WE LIST — I'LL GIVE YOUR HONOR A CHANCE TO GET TO IT — BUT IN WHICH WE LIST — ACTUALLY, IN THE RICO ALLEGATION SECTION — BUT WE LIST SEVERAL SOCIAL MEDIA POSTS BY STARKIST WHERE THEY'RE AGAIN REITERATING THEIR DOLPHIN—SAFE PLEDGE.

AND THIS IS ADMITTEDLY NOT IN THE COMPLAINT BUT COULD BE ALLEGED IN AN AMENDED COMPLAINT, ON THE DAY WE FILED THE

	FIRST COMPLAINT IN THIS ACTION, STARKIST PUT FORTH A FACEBOOK
	POST. VERY SIMPLE. IT HAD A LARGE PICTURE OF THE DOLPHIN SAFE
	LOGO, AND A VERY SHORT STATEMENT ACCOMPANYING IT, AND THE
	STATEMENT READ:
,	"STARKIST IS PROUD OF OUR
	DOLPHIN-SAFE POLICY THAT WAS ADOPTED IN
	APRIL 1990. WE WILL NOT PURCHASE ANY TUNA
	CAUGHT IN ASSOCIATION WITH DOLPHINS, AND WE
,	CONDEMN FISHING METHODS THAT ARE KNOWN TO BE
	DANGEROUS TO THEM."
	WELL, AS WE ALLEGE IN THE COMPLAINT, THE FISHING
	METHODS THEY USE ARE QUITE DANGEROUS TO DOLPHINS.
	SO, AGAIN, THESE ARE PROMISES AND PLEDGES THAT, AS
	YOU HAVE RECOGNIZED, GO WELL ABOVE THE DCPIA REQUIREMENTS,
	TAKES THEM INTO A WHOLE OTHER LEAGUE.
	THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. STAY HERE BECAUSE I WANT TO
	GO ON TO DONGWON FOR A SECOND. DO YOU HAVE ANY ARGUMENT THAT
	YOU WANT TO MAKE WITH RESPECT TO THAT?
,	MR. PENNY: FOR DONGWON, CAN I TURN THAT OVER TO MY
	COLLEAGUE, STU DAVIDSON, WHO'S PREPARED TO DISCUSS DONGWON?
	THE COURT: OKAY.
	MR. DAVIDSON: GOOD AFTERNOON, YOUR HONOR.
	THE COURT: GOOD AFTERNOON.
	MR. DAVIDSON: SO, I'VE HEARD YOUR TENTATIVE YOUR
	TENTATIVE RULING ON PERSONAL JURISDICTION WITH RESPECT TO

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DONGWON, AND WHAT I'D LIKE TO DO IS JUST GO THROUGH WHAT YOU'VE SAID AND RESPOND TO THAT IN THE HOPES THAT MAYBE I CAN CHANGE YOUR MIND.

YOU MENTIONED WITH RESPECT TO DONGWON THAT STARKIST WAS ADEQUATELY CAPITALIZED AT THE TIME OF FORMATION. MY RESPONSE TO THAT IS TWO-FOLD.

NUMBER ONE IS, IT IS ESSENTIALLY UNDISPUTED THAT
CURRENTLY STARKIST IS NOT ADEQUATELY CAPITALIZED. THE BEST
THAT DONGWON HAS ON THAT FRONT IS TO HAVE A DECLARATION OF
MR. CHOI, WHO'S PART OF DONGWON, THE PARENT COMPANY FOR
STARKIST, AND WHAT MR. CHOI SAYS IN HIS DECLARATION -- AND THIS
IS NOT A JOKE, IS, UPON INFORMATION AND BELIEF STARKIST IS
ADEQUATELY CAPITALIZED, WHICH I THINK, JUST OBJECTIVELY
SPEAKING, IS SOMEWHAT HUMOROUS, GIVEN THAT IT'S THE PARENT
COMPANY OF STARKIST AND THE BEST THAT DONGWON HAS ON THAT FRONT
IS UPON INFORMATION AND BELIEF.

AND THE REASON THAT'S THE BEST THEY HAVE -- AND THEY HAVE NO DECLARATION OF STARKIST AT ALL -- IS BECAUSE STARKIST HAS ADMITTED AT LEAST FOUR TIMES BEFORE JUDGE CHEN THAT IT IS NOT ADEQUATELY CAPITALIZED, IT'S ON THE VERGE OF BANKRUPTCY, AND THAT IT COULD NOT AFFORD A 50 MILLION-DOLLAR FINE OR A HUNDRED MILLION DOLLAR FINE, AND NO BANK IS WILLING TO GIVE IT ANY TYPE OF SHORT-TERM LOAN.

BUT TURNING TO WHAT YOUR HONOR SAID, WHICH IS, AT THE TIME OF FORMATION, STARKIST WAS ADEQUATELY CAPITALIZED. WITH

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DUE RESPECT, I BELIEVE THAT THAT'S NOT WHAT THE NINTH CIRCUIT SAYS IS THE TEST FOR ADEQUATE CAPITALIZATION. FIRST, I DON'T THINK IT'S -- IT SHOULDN'T BE A DISPUTE THAT THE NINTH CIRCUIT HAS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, TIME AND AGAIN, SAID THAT INADEQUATE CAPITALIZATION IS BY ITSELF ENOUGH TO MEET THE UNITY OF INTEREST TEST, RIGHT?

BUT IN THE BOARD -- I THINK IT'S THE BOARD OF

TRUSTEES VERSUS VALLEY CABINET CASE -- IT'S A NINTH CIRCUIT

CASE FROM 1989 -- THE NINTH CIRCUIT SAYS THAT POST-FORMATION

INADEQUATE CAPITALIZATION OR POST FORMATION ABUSE OF THE

CORPORATE FORM -- I THINK IS THE WORDS THAT THE COURT USED -
WOULD BE ENOUGH TO SHOW INADEQUATE CAPITALIZATION.

SO, IN OUR VIEW, IF THE COURT LOOKS AND DETERMINES
THAT THAT'S THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S RULE ON THAT AND THAT WE CAN
LOOK AT POST-FORMATION CAPITALIZATION, IN OUR VIEW, GIVEN
STARKIST'S CONTINUED ADMISSIONS IN THIS CRIMINAL CASE BEFORE
JUDGE CHEN THAT'S IN THE MIDDLE OF TRIAL RIGHT NOW -- I THINK
ITS BUMBLE BEE EXECUTIVES -- WE THINK WE WIN ON THAT FRONT.

SO I WOULD ASK YOUR HONOR TO LOOK AT THAT BOARD OF TRUSTEE DECISION.

THE COURT: I THOUGHT YOU WERE GOING TO ASK ME TO WALK DOWN THE HALLWAY AND TALK TO JUDGE CHEN.

MR. DAVIDSON: IS IT ON THIS FLOOR, TOO? OH, I
DIDN'T KNOW. I KNEW JUDGE SEEBORG IS NEXT DOOR BECAUSE I WAS
THERE A COUPLE OF MONTHS AGO.

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AS FAR AS UNITY OF INTEREST GENERALLY GOES, YOU KNOW, JUDGE SAMMARTINO IN THE PACKAGED SEAFOOD CASE, HE FOUND THAT THE UNITY OF INTEREST TEST WAS MET WITH THIS EXACT RELATIONSHIP, DONGWON AND STARKIST, AND THEY DIDN'T EVEN HAVE THE INADEQUATE CAPITALIZATION ISSUE THERE BECAUSE IT WASN'T YET KNOWN. STARKIST HASN'T MADE THOSE ADMISSIONS IN FRONT OF JUDGE CHEN. SO, IN OUR VIEW, EVEN IF WE DIDN'T HAVE THE INADEQUATE CAPITALIZATION, WHICH WE DO, IF THE COURT SIMPLY

LOOKED AT JUDGE SAMMARTINO'S DEFINITION IN THE PACKAGED SEAFOOD CASE, I BELIEVE THAT THE UNITY OF INTEREST TEST WOULD BE MET.

THAT DOESN'T NECESSARILY GET US ALL THE WAY, RIGHT? THE NINTH CIRCUIT SAYS YOU HAVE TO MEET THE UNITY OF INTEREST TEST AND YOU NEED TO SHOW THAT IT WOULD FRUSTRATE A MERITORIOUS CLAIM.

AND, YOU KNOW, I WOULD NOTE THAT -- IN CANDOR, THAT JUDGE SAMMARTINO FOUND IN THE PACKAGED SEAFOOD CASE, THAT THE FRUSTRATION OF MERITORIOUS CLAIM WAS NOT MET, BUT, YOU KNOW, I WAS LOOKING AT THE DECISION, AND WHAT JUDGE SAMMARTINO NOTED WAS THAT IT HAD NOT ACTUALLY EVEN BEEN ARGUED, AND THAT'S WHY HE FOUND THAT THAT PRONG HAD NOT BEEN MET.

HE SAID, QUOTE, "HOWEVER, THEY MAKE NO ATTEMPT TO DEMONSTRATE HOW ANY COMPLAINT ALLEGES AN INEQUITABLE RESULT. SO WHILE I RECOGNIZE JUDGE SAMMARTINO DID NOT FIND ALTEREGO IN THAT CASE, IT WAS NOT BECAUSE HE HAD NOT FOUND UNITY OF

INTEREST MET, WHICH HE HAD, BUT BECAUSE THEY HAD NOT ARGUED THE 1 2 FORMATION ISSUE. 3 THE COURT: JUDGE SAMMARTINO IS A WOMAN, BY THE WAY. 4 MR. DAVIDSON: I'M SORRY. MY APOLOGIES. I DIDN'T 5 REALIZE I JUST SAID THAT, SO I APOLOGIZE TO JUDGE SAMMARTINO 6 FOR THAT. 7 SO, HERE, UNLIKE IN THAT CASE, WE HAVE ARGUED THAT IT WOULD FRUSTRATE A MERITORIOUS CLAIM, NOT JUST THE FACT THAT 8 9 THERE'S THIS INADEQUATE CAPITALIZATION NOW THAT EXISTS, AND SO 10 WE MAY BE LEFT WITHOUT A POCKET TO EVEN OBTAIN A JUDGMENT FROM 11 IN THIS CASE, BUT WE'VE ALLEGED THAT DONGWON, WHO CONTROLS THE 12 ENTIRE FISHING FLEET -- OR NOT ALL OF IT, BUT A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF STARKIST'S FISHING FLEET AND CONSIDERS STARKIST 1.3 14 ESSENTIALLY A BRAND WHICH DONGWON USES TO SELL ITS TUNA --15 THAT'S WHAT IT SAYS ON THEIR OWN WEBSITE -- THAT THEY ARE A VALID DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE. 16 17 SO I UNDERSTAND YOUR HONOR'S TENTATIVE RULING, BUT, WITH RESPECT, I WOULD ASK YOUR HONOR TO TAKE A LOOK AT THE 18 19 BOARD OF TRUSTEES CASE. 20 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 21 MR. DAVIDSON: THE ONLY OTHER THING I'D LIKE TO ADD 22 IS THE ISSUE OF DISCOVERY. I KNOW YOUR HONOR KNOWS THE NINTH 23 CIRCUIT'S FOUND ERRORS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS WHEN PERSONAL 2.4 JURISDICTION DISCOVERY HAS NOT TAKEN PLACE. 25 WHEN YOU HAVE A SITUATION HERE, YOUR HONOR, THAT THE

BEST DEFENDANT CAN MUSTER ON CAPITALIZATION IS "UPON 1 INFORMATION AND BELIEF" FOR ITS OWN SUBSIDIARY. IN OUR VIEW, 2 3 THAT JUST BEGS THE OUESTION AS TO REALLY WHAT'S GOING ON THERE. 4 AND, YOU KNOW, I UNDERSTAND YOUR HONOR SAID WE CAN --IF WE LEARN THROUGH DISCOVERY THAT THERE'S A BASIS FOR 5 6 JURISDICTION FOR -- OVER DONGWON, WE CAN ALWAYS COME BACK, AND I UNDERSTAND AND I APPRECIATE THAT. BUT JUST SO WE'RE ALL 7 CLEAR IN THE COURTROOM, THE DISCOVERY WE WOULD BE SEEKING OF 8 9 STARKIST WOULD NOT BE YOUR TYPICAL PROVING YOUR CLAIMS OR GOING 10 TO YOUR DEFENSES. IT WOULD BE GOING TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION, 11 SUCH AS THEIR BALANCE SHEET AND THEIR PROJECTED INCOME AND 12 INFORMATION REGARDING DONGWON'S SALE OF ITS OWN SUBSIDIARY TO STARKIST, WHICH STARKIST NOW SAYS IT CAN'T SELL TO PAY A FINE 1.3 14 BEFORE JUDGE CHEN, WHICH THE DOJ CATEGORIZED AS OUITE CURIOUS. 15 THAT'S THE TYPE OF DISCOVERY WE WOULD BE LOOKING FOR. 16 SO I JUST DON'T WANT THERE TO BE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING HERE, IS 17 THAT WE'RE GOING TO BE SEEKING THAT DISCOVERY FROM STARKIST, JUST BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT'S THE INFORMATION WE WOULD NEED 18 19 TO -- IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH THAT DONGWON SHOULD BE IN FRONT OF 20 THIS COURT. 21 THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. I APPRECIATE IT. 22 THE COURT: THANK YOU. MR. KAO. 23 MR. KAO: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. CHRIS KAO, K-A-O, 24 FOR DONGWON. THE PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENT WAS A LITTLE 25 SCATTERSHOT, SO I'LL TRY TO ADDRESS EACH OF THESE POINTS. BUT

IF THERE ARE ANY POINTS THAT I HAVE NOT ADDRESSED THAT YOUR HONOR HAS QUESTIONS ABOUT, I'M HAPPY TO DO SO.

1.3

SO LET ME START WITH THE UNDERCAPITALIZATION POINT.

MOST OF WHAT COUNSEL IS ARGUING IS NOWHERE IN THE PLEADINGS. IT ONLY APPEARS IN THEIR OPPOSITION BRIEF. BUT SETTING THAT ASIDE, I THINK IT'S MISGUIDED, AND I DON'T MEAN TO USE A PUN HERE, BUT I DON'T THINK THEY SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO A FISHING EXPEDITION HERE BASED ON THESE CONCLUSORY ALLEGATIONS THAT THERE IS UNDER CAPITALIZATION WHERE THERE ARE NO ACTUAL FACTS PLED IN THE COMPLAINT OR STATED IN THEIR OPPOSITION.

THE COURT: WELL, CAN YOU REPRESENT TO ME NOW THAT
STARKIST IS ADEQUATELY CAPITALIZED AND COULD ADDRESS ANY SORT
OF LIABILITIES THAT MIGHT COME OUT OF THIS LITIGATION?

MR. KAO: SO I'M NOT COUNSEL FOR STARKIST, SO I DON'T KNOW THAT I COULD PERSONALLY ON BEHALF OF DONGWON MAKE THAT REPRESENTATION. BUT WHAT I CAN SAY, AND AS WE DISCUSSED IN OUR BRIEFING, STARKIST WAS -- EXISTED PRIOR TO DONGWON ACQUIRING THEM. IT EXISTED AS A GOING CONCERN. IT HAS EXISTED AS A GOING CONCERN SINCE DONGWON ACQUIRED IT AS A SUBSIDIARY, AND IT HAS NEVER BEEN IN A SITUATION WHERE IT HASN'T BEEN ABLE TO PAY ITS OPERATING COSTS, WHICH IS REALLY THE STANDARD.

IF YOU LOOK AT THE CASES, THE CONCERN IS WITH UNDERCAPITALIZATION TO A LEVEL WHERE THE COMPANY REALLY CANNOT MEET ITS ONGOING OPERATING EXPENSES, WHICH IS CERTAINLY NOT THE CASE HERE. THERE'S NO EVIDENCE OF THAT IN THE RECORD.

STARKIST, OBVIOUSLY, IS AN OPERATING COMPANY.

ALL THAT THE PLAINTIFF COULD POINT TO IS PRESS

COVERAGE REGARDING THIS OTHER CASE THAT'S PENDING BEFORE JUDGE

CHEN WHERE STARKIST EXPRESSED CONCERNS, IF THERE WERE A CERTAIN

SET OF FACTS, RIGHT? IT WASN'T -- THEY WEREN'T EVEN TALKING

ABOUT A SPECIFIC FINE, IT WAS IF THERE WAS A FINE, A CERTAIN

FINE IN A CRIMINAL CASE, IF THEY WERE PILED ON TOP OF THAT

FINES IN ANTITRUST CIVIL CLASS ACTIONS THAT WERE GOING ON, THEN

THERE MIGHT BE A -- YOU MIGHT EVENTUALLY REACH A STAGE WHERE

STARKIST WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PAY. BUT THERE WAS NOTHING THAT

SUGGESTED THAT STARKIST WAS UNDERCAPITALIZED AND IT'S ON THE

VERGE OF BANKRUPTCY. THAT'S JUST AN EXAGGERATION OF WHAT WAS

SAID.

AND, IN PARTICULAR, I SHOULD NOTE THAT THE VERY WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLE THAT THE PLAINTIFF CITED TO IN THEIR OPPOSITION, THE COURT EXPRESSED, YOU KNOW, SKEPTICISM OF WHETHER ANY OF THAT WOULD COME TO PASS, THAT THERE WOULD BE THE SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT BANKRUPTCY.

BUT, AGAIN, THAT'S NOT THE TEST. THE TEST FOR

CAPITALIZATION IS WHETHER IT WAS ADEQUATELY CAPITALIZED AT

FORMATION, AND WHETHER CIRCUMSTANCES LATER ON AFFECT THE

COMPANY, THAT'S NOT THE TEST FOR WHETHER THERE WOULD BE AN

INJUSTICE OR FRAUD THAT WOULD BE PERPETRATED BY NOT ALLOWING OR

BY, YOU KNOW, NOT ALLOWING THE -- THE PARENT COMPANY TO BE

BROUGHT INTO THE CASE.

SO I JUST DON'T THINK THERE'S A BASE IN FACT OR LAW FOR DONGWON TO BE BROUGHT INTO THIS CASE BASED SOLELY ON UNDER CAPITALIZATION.

THE COURT: OKAY.

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MR. KAO: AND THE PLAINTIFF ALSO, I THINK,

MISREPRESENTS THE CASE LAW ON THAT. THE CASE LAW IS CLEAR THAT

IS JUST ONE FACTOR, AND IT'S NOT -- EVEN IF THE COURT WERE TO

FIND THAT THAT WAS ADEQUATELY ALLEGED, THAT'S NOT SUFFICIENT ON

AN ALTEREGO THEORY TO BRING DONGWON INTO THE CASE.

AS TO THE UNITY OF INTEREST, I'LL JUST MAKE ONE
POINT, WHICH I THINK MAKES A VERY CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN
THIS SITUATION AND OTHER CASES IN WHICH COURTS HAVE FOUND
PARENT COMPANIES TO BE ALTEREGOS AS A MARKETING CONFLICT, OR
WHATEVER, AS THE PLAINTIFF HAS SUGGESTED.

IN THOSE CASES -- THERE'S A TOYOTA AMERICA CASE, FOR EXAMPLE. THE U.S. SUBSIDIARY IS REALLY JUST A SALES OFFICE, A SALES OPERATION TO SELL THE PRODUCTS OF THE PARENT COMPANY IN THE UNITED STATES.

THAT IS NOT THE SITUATION HERE. STARKIST IS SELLING

ITS OWN PRODUCTS IN THE U.S. MARKET. IT'S NOT SELLING

DONGWON'S PRODUCTS. AND THAT IS -- THAT'S EXEMPLIFIED BY THE

FACT THAT DONGWON ACQUIRED STARKIST LATER. RIGHT? IT WASN'T

OPENED AS A SALES OPERATION FOR DONGWON. IT WAS A SEPARATE

COMPANY THAT THROUGH A CORPORATE ACQUISITION DONGWON ACQUIRED.

SO I DON'T THINK THERE'S A UNITY OF INTEREST UNDER THAT

1	MARKETING CONDUIT FACTOR EITHER.									
2	AND, LASTLY, I JUST WANTED TO ADDRESS THE DISCOVERY									
3	POINT. IT'S OBVIOUSLY WITHIN YOUR HONOR'S DISCRETION TO ALLOW									
4	THAT OR NOT. THERE ARE MANY CASES WHERE DISTRICT COURTS AND									
5	HAVE BEEN AFFIRMED BY THE NINTH CIRCUIT AS WELL WHERE THE									
6	COURT HAS DECIDED THERE WAS SIMPLY NOT ENOUGH PLED IN THE									
7	COMPLAINT TO MAKE DISCOVERY APPROPRIATE, AND I BELIEVE THIS IS									
8	ONE OF THOSE SITUATIONS.									
9	THE COURT: OKAY. GREAT.									
10	MR. DAVIDSON: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.									
11	MR. LYNCH: (INDISCERNIBLE.)									
12	THE COURT: MR. LYNCH, COME ON BACK UP.									
13	MR. LYNCH: OKAY. I JUST WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS A									
14	COUPLE OF POINTS, IF I MAY. THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. I'LL TRY									
15	TO BE VERY BRIEF.									
16	SO THE I GUESS THE INITIAL ISSUE OF WHETHER THAT									
17	LABEL BEING DIFFERENT CAUSES A PROMISE THAT IS GREATER THAN THE									
18	STANDARD SET FORTH BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, OUR POSITION IS									
19	THAT THE LABEL IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME. IT USES THE SAME TWO									
20	WORDS, WHICH ARE "DOLPHIN SAFE."									
21	AND I THINK COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS WAS TRYING TO									
22	IDENTIFY IN RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTION OTHER PROMISES THAT									

AND SO THE FIRST WAS IN PARAGRAPH 38 A STATEMENT THAT

PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE STARKIST HAS MADE THAT TAKE THEIR PROMISE

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25

ABOVE THAT FEDERAL LABEL.

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WAS -- IT WAS A PRESS RELEASE BY AN INDUSTRY GROUP OF WHICH STARKIST IS A PART OF. I JUST WANT TO POINT OUT, YOU KNOW, WHAT THAT SAYS, RIGHT? SO THAT SAYS THAT THESE THREE U.S.
BRANDS WANT TO REASSURE CONSUMERS THAT THEY HAVE NO REASON TO BE CONCERNED THAT THEIR COMPANIES ARE WAIVERING IN THEIR COMMITMENT TO PROVIDING DOLPHIN-SAFE TUNA, WHICH IS THE SAME TERMINOLOGY USED ON THE FEDERAL REGULATION AS A RESULT OF THIS RULING, AND THE COMPANIES DO NOT AND WILL NOT UTILIZE TUNA CAUGHT IN A MANNER THAT HARMS DOLPHINS, PROVIDING CONSUMERS WITH SUSTAINABLE AND DOLPHIN-SAFE TUNA -- DOLPHIN-SAFE TUNA AGAIN -- REMAINS A TOP PRIORITY.

SO TO THE EXTENT THAT THE ADDITIONAL PROMISE RELATES
TO THE FISHING TECHNIQUES, I DO WANT TO JUST POINT OUT, IF I
MAY, THE ACTUAL TEXT OF THE DPCIA. SO THE DPCIA TELLS TUNA
COMPANIES HOW THEY CAN GO ABOUT FISHING IN ORDER FOR THEIR TUNA
TO BE CALLED DOLPHIN SAFE.

AND WHAT IT DOES IS IT OUTLAWS COMPLETELY TWO WAYS

THAT HAVE BEEN USED BEFORE 1990. ONE IS A DRIFTNET, AND ONE IS

WHEN YOU LITERALLY TARGET THE DOLPHINS -- THERE'S A PORTION OF

THE PACIFIC OCEAN WHERE DOLPHINS -- TUNA SWIM UNDER DOLPHINS,

AND THERE WAS A TECHNIQUE BACK THEN WHERE THEY TARGETED THAT.

SO THERE'S NO ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT THAT STARKIST IS

ENGAGED IN EITHER OF THOSE TYPES OF TECHNIQUES, AND THAT IS

TRUE.

THE SECOND ONE IS -- SO THERE'S TWO OTHER TECHNIQUES

CALLED PURSE SEINE AND A LONG LINE. NOW, THOSE ARE NOT PER SE 1 DANGEROUS TO DOLPHINS, RIGHT? SO THERE ARE WAYS TO FISH WHERE 2 3 YOU DON'T HURT DOLPHINS. AND IN ORDER FOR THE TUNA TO BE 4 MARKED DOLPHIN SAFE, THE CAPTAIN OF THAT BOAT NEEDS TO CERTIFY 5 THAT NO DOLPHIN WAS KILLED OR SERIOUSLY INJURED IN SET OR GEAR 6 DEPLOYMENT ON THAT TRIP. AND THEN THERE ARE SEPARATE 7 REGULATIONS THAT REQUIRE SEPARATION IF -- IF DOLPHINS ARE HURT IN TERMS OF WHICH TUNA CAN GO WHERE. 8 9 SO THERE ARE NO ALLEGATIONS, YOUR HONOR, THAT WE 10 VIOLATED EITHER OF THOSE TWO. 11 THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND. AND NOR DO I THINK --12 ACTUALLY, I'M, I THINK, DONE WITH THE "BUTS" AT THIS POINT. 1.3 I'VE BEEN ON THE BENCH SINCE 7:30 THIS MORNING, AND THE 14 ARGUMENT THAT YOU'RE MAKING THE SAME ARGUMENT THAT YOU STARTED 15 WITH, WHICH IS THAT STARKIST DOESN'T VIOLATE THE DPCIA, AND THE -- MY READING OF THE COMPLAINT IS THAT THAT'S NOT WHAT THE 16 17 ALLEGATION IS. SO I APPRECIATE THE ARGUMENT, AND I'LL LOOK AT IT 18 19 WHEN -- WHEN I GET OFF THE BENCH JUST TO SATISFY MYSELF, AND 20 THEN WE'LL MOVE FORWARD WITH THE CASE. 21 MR. LYNCH: THANK YOU. I WAS REALLY NOT -- I WAS 22 ARGUING --THANK YOU. 23 THE COURT: 24 I WAS RESPONDING TO THEIR ARGUMENT --MR. LYNCH: 25 THE COURT: THANK YOU VERY MUCH, MR. LYNCH.

1		ALL	RIGHT.	I'LL	TRY	ТО	GET	AN	ORDER	OUT	AS	SOON	AS	I
2	CAN.													
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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIBER

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ACTION.

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE AND CORRECT
TRANSCRIPT, TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY, OF THE ABOVE PAGES OF
THE OFFICIAL ELECTRONIC SOUND RECORDING PROVIDED TO ME BY THE
U.S. DISTRICT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, OF THE
PROCEEDINGS TAKEN ON THE DATE AND TIME PREVIOUSLY STATED IN THE
ABOVE MATTER.

I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT I AM NEITHER COUNSEL FOR,
RELATED TO, NOR EMPLOYED BY ANY OF THE PARTIES TO THE ACTION IN
WHICH THIS HEARING WAS TAKEN; AND, FURTHER, THAT I AM NOT
FINANCIALLY NOR OTHERWISE INTERESTED IN THE OUTCOME OF THE

prolumbini

JOAN MARIE COLUMBINI

NOVEMBER 7, 2019